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Introduction 
Cyber and the Changing Face of War 
Claire Finkelstein and Kevin Govern 
I. War and Technological Change 
In 2012, journalist David Sanger reported that the United States, in conjunction with 
Israel, had unleashed a massive virus into the computer system of the Iranian nuclear 
reactor at Natanz, where the Iranians were engaged in enriching uranium for use in 
nuclear weaponry.1 Operation "Olympic Games" was conceived as an alternative to a 
kinetic attack on Iran's nuclear facilities. It was the first major offensive use of America's 
cyberwar capacity, but it was seen as justified because of the importance of preempt­
ing Iran's development of nuclear weapons. The so-called "Stuxnet" virus successfully 
wreaked havoc with Iran's nuclear capabilities, damaging critical infrastructure and 
spreading massive confusion among Iranian scientists and engineers. The damage was 
comparable to a direct physical attack on Natanz, though perhaps even more debilitat­
ing, given the difficulties of attribution and the extremely covert nature of the attack. 
Operation Olympic Games issued in a new era in national defense. As former CIA 
Chief Michael Hayden reportedly remarked, "This is the first attack of a major nature in 
which a cyber attack was used to effect physical destruction."2 He likened the transforma­
tion in warfare to that which occurred in 1945 with the release of the atomic bomb over 
Hiroshima. The computer infrastructure ofNorth Korea sustained serious damage, just 
two days after President Obama warned that the United States would not accept North 
Korea's threats to attack the infrastructure of Sony pictures unless they cancelled plans 
to make the movie The Interview, intended to portray a CIA plot to kill North Korean 
President Kim Jong-Un. Sony capitulated and cancelled the movie premiere, much to the 
consternation of the U.S. government.3 
Cyberwar, also known as cyberspace operations, is defined �y a Department of 
Defense Memorandum as "(t]he employment of cyber capabilities where the primary 
purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace. " 4  The Memorandum goes 
on to say that such operations "include computer network operations and activities to 
operate and defend the Global Information Grid." As this definition makes clear, the 
1 David E Sanger, "Obama Order Sped Up Wave o f Cyberattacks Against Iran," The New York Times, 
June 1, 2012, at <http:/ /www.nytimes.com/20 12/06/01/world/m idd leeast/obama-ordered-wave-of­
cyberattacks-against-iran.html>. 
2 See David E Sanger, Confront and Conceal (London: Crown Publishers, 2012), 200. 
3 Soraya N McDonald, " Sony tells theaters they can pass on showing 'The Interview.' Premiere 
canceled," Washington Post, December 17, 2014, at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning­
mix/wp/20 14/ 12/17 /sony-tells-theaters-they-can-pass-on -showing-the-interview I>. 
• Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, " Memorandum for Chiefs of the Military Services: joint 
Terminology for Cyberspace Operations," Washington, November 2010, at james E. Cartwright http:// 
www.defense.gov/bios/biographydetail.aspx?biographyid=l38; "joint Terminology for Cyberspace 
Operations," in Cyberwar Resources Guide, Item #51, at <http://www.projectcyw-d.org/resources/items/ 
show/51> (accessed November 26, 2014). 
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concept of cyberwar contains an implicit recognition that the US has a security inter­
est in the operation of its electronic network that surpasses the immediate impact of 
military operations on the protection of human life. Protecting the Grid is compara­
ble to protecting our physical borders: informational security and autonomy have thus 
become key attributes of national sovereignty. 
The importance of defending our electronic infrastructure grows consistently as 
our dependence on information technology grows. Offensive cyber capacities are of 
increasing military importance, due to the converse dependence on information tech­
nology on the part of our adversaries. At the same time that cyber attacks are provid­
ing an increasingly attractive alternative to direct kinetic operations, US and other 
forces have independently been shifting from kinetic targeting strategies towards 
more multifaceted approaches, such as those involving diplomacy, economic assis­
tance, education and communications. Cyber operations fit somewhat better with this 
approach than do traditional kinetic operations. The changing nature of warfare, as 
well as the changed circumstances in which war takes place, have enhanced the attrac­
tions of inflicting the damage of war by non-kinetic means. The methods of cyberwar 
have thus arrived at a propitious moment. 
II. Placing Cyberwar in Historical Context 
In 2006, the Department of Defense (DoD) Joint Staff developed a formerly-classi­
fied "National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations," reflecting a substantially 
developed and operationally integrated defense cyber capacity. 5 That strategy defined 
cyberspace as "a domain characterized by the use of electronics and the electromag­
netic spectrum to store, modify and exchange information via networked informa­
tion systems and physical infrastructures." 6  By 2011, the concept of cyber operations 
was well enough established that (retired) General Michael Hayden, former Director 
of the National Security Agency and Central Intelligence Agency, could comment: 
"[!)ike everyone else who is or has been in a US military uniform, I think of cyber as 
a domain. It is now enshrined in doctrine: land, sea, air, space, cyber."7 However, the 
seeds of the cyber revolution were sown long before 2011 ,  even prior to the develop­
ment of computer technology. The techniques of cyberwar are a subset of a broader 
approach to national defense technology, one that involves the use of the electromag­
netic spectrum. The more general category might aptly be called "Electromagnetic 
Warfare" (EW),  of which both cyber and electromagnetic activities are a part.8 
5 DoD, "The National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations" (2006) 11. 
6 DoD, "The National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations" (2006) ll. 
7 Michael V Hayden, "The Future ofThings 'Cyber"' (2011) 5 Strategic Studies Quarterly 3. By contrast, 
Libicki's conclusion is very much the opposite: 
[U]nderstanding cyberspace as a warfighting domain is not helpful when it comes to under­
standing what can and should be done to defend and attack networked systems. To the extent 
that such a characterization leads strategists and operators to presumptions or conclusions 
that are not derived from observation and experience, this characterization may well mislead. 
Libicki, (n 4) 336. 
8 See Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-38, Cyber Electromagnetic Activities, February 
2014 at <http://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-38.pdf>. 
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One of the first uses of the harnessed electromagnetic spectrum for communica­
tions in warfare was the telegraph.9 The telegraph also became the first physical target 
of EW more than one hundred years prior to the cyber age. By the time of the civil 
war, 50,000 miles of telegraph cable had been laid for purely military purposes.10 The 
telegraph was as much of a revolution jn military affairs in the 19th Century as cyber­
warfare is in the 21st. Mobile military telegraph wagons sent and received messages 
behind the front lines all the way to the first President Lincoln's War Department 
Telegraph Office. 1 1  Prior to this innovation, the ability to have rapid exchanges 
between a national leader at the seat of government and his forces in the field had been 
difficult to impossible. With the telegraph, however, there could be almost instantane­
ous communication between Washington and armies in distant fields. 1 2  
The demands on this valuable means of communication led to the first governmen­
tal seizure of electronic communications systems. Congressional Act of January 31, 
1862 authorized the President to take possession of railroad and telegraph lines if 
in his judgment public safety so required.13 Pursuant to this Act, on February 26, 
1862, the President seized control of all telegraphic lines, thus laying the ground for 
executive control of electronic communications and technology as part and parcel of 
national defense efforts.14 
By World War I, there was widespread use of wireless radios for civilian commu­
nications as well as military transmission of combat information. This was a great 
advantage, as wireless radios were less susceptible to damage from enemy artillery 
barrages than were wired telephone lines, and they were not subject to enemy listen­
ing by induction.15 British intelligence was able to crack the code used for messages 
to and from the German station, and in this way intercepted the infamous German 
"Zimmerman telegrams" to Mexico, which invited Mexico to attack US territory. 
Technological advances in espionage had thus uncovered one of the crucial pieces of 
information that would contribute to bringing America into the war.16 
By 1916, the British were experimenting with jamming enemywireless intercept oper­
ations, and jamming began along the entire British front in October 1916.17 Both sides 
experimented with early efforts at electronic deception, such as false transmissions, 
9 Since the telegraph operates using electrical signals transmitted across wire lines, telegraph opera­
tions are electromagnetic in nature, as are radio, telephone, radar, infrared, ultraviolet and other less 
used sections of the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum. See J B Calvert, The Electromagnetic Telegraph 
(2000), and Tom Wheeler, Mr. Lincoln's T-Mails: The U11told Story Of How Abraham Lincoln Used The 
Telegraph To Win The Civil War (2007) 
10 Daniel W Crofts, Communication Breakdown, New York Times May 21, 2011. 
11 David H. Bates, Lincoln in the Telegraph Office: Recollections oft he United States Military Telegraph 
Corps during the Civil War (1995) ix. 
12 Bates (n 36) x .  13 12 Stat. 334 ( 1862). 
14 A concession to private commercial demand for and access to the telegraph was made by the War 
Department, which articulated that the possession of the telegraph lines was "not intended to interfere 
in any respect with the ordinary affairs of the companies or with private business." Joshua R. Clark, 
Emergency Legislation Passed Prior to December, 1917, Collected, Annotated and Indexed Under TI1e 
Direction of The Attorney General, Current Emergency Legislation 10. 
15 Sterling (n 43) 445 16 Sterling (n 43) 445. 
17 Co mint and Com sec: The Tactics of 1914-1918- Part I I Sum mer 1972 Vol 2, No. 3 11. The report also 
notes that "[t]he British soon found that jamming was costly and ineffective and it was discontinued." 
Comint and Comsec (n 47) 11.  
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dummy traffic and other similar ruses for misleading the enemy.18 During World War 
II, the British began to equip their aircraft with noise jammers and passive electronic 
countermeasures (ECM) as an effort to foil the sophisticated Wurzburg gun-laying 
German radars.19 The Japanese were meanwhile working on their own types of radars, 
though their efforts were hampered by a dearth of scientists and engineers, as well as 
by a shortage of materials.20 Throughout the war, there was a fight between rudimen­
tary EW capabilities and simple ECM/1 such that each side would temporarily gain 
the upper hand in EW, only to lose it in a new countermeasure.22 
It was not until well after the advent of the internet and the attacks of9/ll, however, 
that the development of cyberwar techniques began in earnest. Although the ini­
tial foray in this direction came from the Bush Administration, the biggest support 
for technological advance has come from the Obama Administration. In 2012, the 
Administration articulated the National S ecurity Presidential Directive/NSPD-54, 
which remains the US policy definition for cyberspace.23 There is now an agency­
the Pentagon's Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)-that has the 
mission of protecting computer systems and developing the capability to disrupt or 
destroy enemy systems. We are thus transformed, not only in offensive uses of cyber, 
but also in our attempts to use cyber as a tool for defending against the heavily com­
puter-dependent kinetic attacks of others. 
Of course the United S tates and its allies are not the only world powers that have 
been developing a cyberwar capacity. In 2007, security firm McAfee estimated that 120 
countries had already developed ways to use the internet to target financial markets, 
government computer systems, and utilities. In 2008, the Russian government alleg­
edly integrated cyber operations into its conflict with Georgia. According to these 
accusations, Russian cyber intelligence units conducted reconnaissance and infil­
trated Georgian military and government networks. When the conventional fighting 
broke out, Russia used cyberweapons to attack Georgian government and military 
sites as well as communication installations. Foreign militaries, such as China's, have 
conducted exercises in offensive cyber operations, both stealing information from 
other governments and simulating attacks on other countries command and control 
systems. In 2011, Iran boasted that it had the world's second-largest cyber army. With 
states around the globe improving their cyberwarfare capabilities, the world may 
experience a cyber arms race reminiscent of the nuclear arms race of the Cold War. 
Arms races revolving around technological advances in war are nothing new, 
and from experience we know such moments often produce significant changes 
in the fundamental structure of war. Technological developments have consist­
ently transformed the way wars are conducted as well as the nature of the risks 
to both combatant and civilian populations. Most n otably, increasingly sophisti­
cated and deadlier weapons have enabled combatants to keep a greater distance 
18 See, for example, Andrew Eddowes, The Haversack Ruse, and British Deception Operations in 
Palestine During World War I (1994) 
19 Peter). Hugill, Global Communications Since 1844: Geopolitics and Technology (1999) 194 
20 Hugill (n SO) 162. 21 Hugill (n 50) 194. 22 Government of India DRDO (n 33) 14 
23 National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-54 Homeland Security Presidential Directive/ 
HSPD-23, Subject: Cybersecurity Policy ( U), january 8, 2008 at 3. 
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from one another, thus diffusing the risks they face. At the same time, such tech­
nologies have often broadened the scope of war, further increasing risks to civil­
ian populations. Hayden's comparison between cyber and the transformative 
power of the new technology reflected in the nuclear attack on Hiroshima seems 
apt. Less dramatic examples, such as the development of drones, demonstrate the 
same process. 
Precision technologies have increased the distance between combatants at the 
cost of subjecting civilian populations to new risks in other ways, ironically risks 
that combatants no longer face. Despite their capacity for precision, mistakes in 
the use of such weapons have been common, due to inaccurate information, unin­
tended effects on third parties, ranging from death and bodily injury to more dif­
fuse effects, such as the repeated stress from exposure to drones in the vicinity of 
their targets. Where the use of drones is a persistent feature of everyday life, civil­
ians report symptoms of trauma and anxiety from living in their midst. No tech­
nological change to date, however, appears to rival this transformative potential 
to the same degree as the development of cyber offensive capacities. Indeed, this 
is captured by the coining of a new label for the notion of war involving cyber 
attacks, namely "cyberwar," as though it were not only a new kind of weapon, but 
an entirely new genre of war. The possibility that we might be able to destroy a tar­
get like the Iranian nuclear reactor from the "inside out," avoiding detection for 
significant periods of time while an electronic virus works its way through the sys­
tem's infrastructure, opens up the possibility of just such a dramatic change in our 
offensive capabilities. In addition, cyber technology creates the opportunity for a 
new kind of defense strategy, one designed both to counter cyber offensives and to 
pre-empt kinetic attacks, under scenarios that do not fit neatly within the tradi­
tional paradigm of war. When technological evolution is combined with geopoliti­
cal change, such as the demise of state sovereignty and the entrance of civilians or 
non-governmental actors into the arena of war, the transformative nature of cyber 
technology is enhanced. 
III. Transformations in the Nature of War 
The revisionary effect of technological change has conspired with dramatic changes 
in the basic structure of war, particularly since the United States engaged al-Qaeda in 
the wake of 9/1 . The most significant shift in the demographics of war is the influx 
of civilians into battle. The US is increasingly drawn into conflict with ideologically 
driven populations, organized into powerful civilian militias, in lieu of governmental 
forces carrying out a concerted state policy of old. With this crucial shift in the land­
scape of war, the formerly bright-line distinction between state and non-state actors has 
been eclipsed, and with it the boundary distinction between combatants and civilians. 
However, we cannot satisfy the requirements of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), 
in particular the crucial principle of distinction, without being able reliably to identify 
who is a legitimate target. In this way, changes in modern warfare have been attended 
by a breakdown of the traditional foundation on which adherence to the rule of law in 
war depends. There is a ripple effect: the widespread entry of civilians into the theater of 
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war results in a corresponding disintegration of the boundary between military juris­
diction, on the one hand, and the jurisdiction of law enforcement, on the other. 
Historically, the distinction between the civilian and combatant populations was a 
sharp one. The uniform was the most visible means of marking that distinction, but 
even without uniforms there would have been little doubt about who was military and 
who civilian. In addition, the civilian population was kept physically separate from war 
by the fact that the fighting took place on a battlefield, the boundaries of which were 
fairly clear. In modern conflicts, the historical distinction of roles is no longer applica­
ble, as the enemy consists in non-state actors who blend nearly seamlessly into the civil­
ian population. This is facilitated by the fact that there is no longer a distinct battlefield 
in war. Military operations now take place anywhere and everywhere. We might indeed 
say that modern war is characterized by a loss of location and the abolition of the tradi­
tional locus of battle, and with the advent of cyberwar we have that process brought to 
an exteme: cyber represents the complete loss of the physical battlefield. The advent of 
war in cyberspace is the culmination of that ebbing of historical boundaries around the 
concept of war. 
It is crucial to understand the link between the availability of cyberwar technol­
ogy and the role of civilians in war. Where the threat to national security comes 
primarily from non-state actors, it is reasonable to anticipate expanded use of tech­
nologies of war where the barriers to entry are low. Such is the case with cyber­
war: members of al-Qaeda or ISIS may, in the long run, be particularly likely to 
turn to cyberweapons to compensate for the kinetic forces they lack. Despite the 
elaborate effort, planning, and expertise that went into Operation Olympic Games, 
destructive cyber attacks can be launched with little preparation or expense. S uch 
attacks, potentially carried out by a small number of individuals with sharply lim­
ited resources, have the power to impose destruction on a level that only kinetic 
attacks have hitherto made possible. What enables such destructive capabilities for 
apparently slight intervention and remote causal impact is the highly technological 
infrastructure of modern life. We are, in effect, leveraged on technology. The same 
can be said for civilian life: we are dependent on computers, and breaches of our 
technological infrastructure can produce devastating results. 
A second crucial change in the circumstances of war is the increasing impor­
tance of both military and personal data. I n  an age when individuals voluntarily 
transmit, store, and receive vast amounts of personal data through the internet, 
planting software in electronic devices to obliterate, alter, or appropriate data has 
become a crucial new tactic of warfare: a "fifth dimension battlefield," as it is often 
said, after air, sea, land and outer space. This shift in frameworks has resulted in 
the merging of military and corporate espionage functions, and for this reason, 
the militarization of cyberspace has created a legal and moral ambiguity regarding 
privacy rights, as well as a personal liability to be targeted in cyberspace by vir­
tue of the mere position one occupies relative to a network of information. These 
tendencies have contributed to the shift in the structure of warfare, with the result 
that the line distinction between the military and the civil domains has faded. 
Cyberwar operations thus occupy a crucial position in the altered landscape of 
military conflict. 
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IV. Is Cyberwar an Act of War? 
It is often debated whether cyber attacks constitute true acts of war. Those who offer a 
negative answer to that question maintain that since cyber attacks can cause only limited 
damage, mostly of an economic nature, such acts do not belong to the domain of war. 
Those who answer affirmatively maintain the irrelevance of the fact that cyber attacks 
do not cause physical damage on the grounds that this argument fails to consider the 
secondary effects of infrastructure failure, particularly where the quality of civilian life 
is concerned. They point out that one need only recall the loss of life routinely caused by 
systems failures from electrical surges during fairly routine temperature spikes in the 
summer months to recognize the destructive potential of cyber attacks.24 In addition, 
they argue that the massive damage that cyber attacks can cause, and the serious use of 
such attacks as an alternative to kinetic attacks in war, belies such claims. Cyberweapons 
and cyberwarfare are now considered by the FBI to be the number one threat to national 
security.25 On the side of the latter position, the US government has taken a functional 
view of the notion of war and declared cyber attacks as acts of war/6 given that cyber 
attacks increasingly serve the function that kinetic attacks have historically served. It 
therefore becomes harder and harder to see such acts as limited to economic and finan­
cial destruction. In response, however, those who reject cyber attacks as acts of war may 
argue that the point is not that cyber attacks fail to cause destruction, but that the nature 
of the destruction is unclear. Brown outs are a case in point: while damage from such 
events may be significant, no one would label them acts of war as a result. Once again, 
cyber events appear to challenge the traditional categories in war, leaving our theoretical 
accounts of war in search of an object. 
A further difficulty with the functional characterization of cyber attacks as acts of 
war is that it does not specify the theory of war against which this judgment is being 
made, and arguably such a theory is necessary in order to know whether a certain 
characterization of acts of destruction should qualify them as acts of war. Traditional 
models of warfare are problematic in this regard, since they have all been implicitly 
called into question by the dramatic changes in the nature of warfare itself. In addi­
tion to the advent of cyber attacks and the introduction of other new technologies, 
there is a fundamental shift in features that formerly characterized acts of war in the 
first place, and it may seem that the theory of war must evolve as quickly as the emer­
gence of challenging marginal cases whose identity we are seeking to understand by 
that theory. Because so-called "cyberwar" puts a particular strain on our traditional 
conception of war, it forces us to return to the basic building blocks of just war theory 
and to re-examine the theory of war in light of striking new examples. 
24 See the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention website at <http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/ 
mmwrhtml!mm6231al.htm>. 
25 See, for example, "FBI: Cyber Attacks-America's Top Terror Threat," RT.com, March 2, 2012, 
at <http://www.rt.com/news/cyber-fbi-security-mueller-691/>; J Nicholas Hoover, "Cyber Attacks 
Becoming Top Terror Threat, FBI Says," Informationweek.com, February l, 2012, at <http://www.infor 
mationweek.com/news/government/security/232600046. 
26 David Sanger and Elisabeth Bulmiller, "Pentagon to Consider Cyberattacks Acts of War," The 
New York Times, May 31,2012, at <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/0l/us/politics/Olcyber.htmb. 
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Cyber attacks, for example, put immense pressure on conventional notions of sov­
ereignty and the moral and legal doctrines that were developed to regulate them. The 
problem stems from the fact that the traditional notion of sovereignty and the bounda­
ries of states seem to disintegrate in the face of a type of conflict where boundaries are 
irrelevant. Could an electronic virus designed to destroy technological infrastructure 
without ever requiring the kinetic infiltration of the territory or another nation pos­
sibly violate the sovereign authority of that other nation? Article 2, Section 4 of the 
UN Charter promises that members will not use the "threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state." This provision, however, is 
likely inadequate in view of the increasing use of cyber attacks. It leads to questions 
of whether problems of cyberwarfare require new treaties and legal definitions. For 
example, does the cyberweapons race require treaties similar to the Treaty on the Non­
Proliferation ofNuclear Weapons? As the country that controls the internet infrastruc­
ture, as well as the country with the highest percentage of internet business as a share 
of its economy, the US is in a uniquely difficult negotiating position in developing any 
treaties. In a world of attack and destruction without conventional military assets, do 
traditional notions of sovereignty based on geography and territorial integrity retain 
their relevance? Unlike past forms of warfare circumscribed by centuries of just war 
tradition and Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) prescriptions, cyberwarfare occupies a 
particularly ambiguous status in the traditions and conventions of the laws of war. 
Then there are the difficulties associated with maintaining the principle of distinc­
tion. If the threat we are facing stems from the engagement of non-state actors in hostili­
ties, there is little choice but to fight the enemy on civilian territory and in and around 
the civilian population.27 This has been one of the most serious developments in warfare 
since World War II. In cyberwar, however, the difficulty we have demarcating the military 
and civilian populations in modern warfare is exacerbated. Combatants and civilians are 
arguably more intertwined than in any other form of war, and, as discussed above, the 
physical identification of the battlefield, which has helped to mark a conflict as military in 
nature, has been eliminated. A possible ramification is that efforts to prevent and defend 
against cyber attacks will result in the complete effacement of the domains of civil and 
military authority-and, to an even greater degree than exists in modern kinetic warfare, 
national defense will invade the domain traditionally reserved for law enforcement. If this 
is true, might military action designed to protect against cyber attacks, for example, pose 
a serious threat to due process rights, or the moral equivalent of such rights in the inter­
national arena? These legal ambiguities, devoid of moral perspective, make adherence to 
the rule of law in cyberwarfare more challenging than in any other domain of warfare.Z8 
V. A Look Ahead 
The chapters in this volume grew out of a conference held at the University of 
Pennsylvania by the Center for Ethics and the Rule of Law (CERL). CERL was founded 
27 Stewart A Baker and Charles ) Dunlap }r, "What is the Role of Lawyers in Cyberwarfare?," 
ABA journal.corn, May l, 2012, at <http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/what_is_the_ 
role_of_lawyers_in_cyberwarfare>. 
28 Baker and Dunlap Jr, "What is the Role of Lawyers in Cyberwarfare?" (n 8). 
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in 2012 to address foundational legal and moral issues that arise in national security 
and modern warfare, particularly those that impact the rule of law. The conference 
was organized to explore questions about the degree to which engaging in war using 
the techniques of cyber technology is compatible with rule of law values. The central 
question was whether cyberwar is consistent with the idea that there are deep moral 
and legal principles, adherence to which successfully limits the permissibility of war 
to cases where those principles are observed. Can we both accept the legitimacy of 
cyberwar and maintain that war is fundamentally a constrained activity, one that can 
be justified according to a set of moral principles? Or does an acceptance of cyberwar, 
insofar as it requires us to relinquish our attachment to so many of the doctrines of 
just war theory, mean that we have given up on the idea that warfare can be limited, in 
favor of a more Clausewitzian vision that anything goes? 
If one does allow that the use of techniques of cyberwar are compatible with the tra­
ditional laws of war, and hence with rule of law values, there are further and more fine­
grained decisions to be made. One might ask whether the laws of war, such as those 
typically applied to kinetic war, must be understood as structured in parallel fashion 
when applied to cyberwar in lieu of conventional techniques of war. Do the laws of 
armed conflict apply to cyberspace in the same way they apply to traditional warfare? 
Proportionality, for example, is a crucial question in military ethics, as well as in domes­
tic criminal law. It requires that no more force be used than is necessary to repel an attack 
or meet other legitimate military objectives. But how does one determine what constitutes 
a necessary response to a cyber attack? Worse, how should we determine whether it is 
ever proportionate to launch an offensive cyberwar attack? Was the attack on the Iranian 
nuclear reactor at Natanz a permissible act of prevention or an illegitimate first strike 
between sovereign nations? More complicated still, would a cyber attack on the part of the 
US against North Korea be proportionate to North Korea's threat against Sony pictures? 
The current volume brings together leading authorities in law, technology, and 
moral philosophy, as well as from multiple academic disciplines and representing 
many types of expertise in practice, to consider the law and morality of cyberwar. 
We have organized the volume into four parts. Part I contains chapters that attempt 
to expose foundational and conceptual issues in cyberwar. The chapters in this part 
primarily seek to answer the question whether acts of cyberwar should count as 
war according to the criteria of Just War Theory. Larry May's and James Cook's 
chapters directly contradict one another on this topic: May argues that so-called 
cyberwar is not in fact a part of the law at all, while Cook maintains that it can be 
so seamlessly considered a part of the law of war that no adjustment of the Just War 
Theory paradigm is even required to fit cyberwar in. May's argument draws atten­
tion to the aim and outcome of cyber attacks. He argues that insofar as such attacks 
do not cause, and do not aim to cause, massive loss of life and injury, they are too 
distant from the types of acts the laws of war have sought to regulate, and so can­
not be considered acts of war. May's argument depends on a distinct characteriza­
tion of war, one we have a !ready identified as necessary if one is to consider whether 
the laws of war have proper application to cyber attacks. For example, for May, law 
must be a public phenomenon. But since cyber attacks are clandestine, May argues, 
they do not fit within the characterization of the norms of war that come down 
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to us through the ages. Thus, May suggests that cyber attacks should be assessed 
according to the ordinary rules that govern the ethics of conduct in ordinary life, 
rather than according to the more permissive standard of the rules of war. 
James Cook disagrees, and sees traditional Just War Theory as applying as read­
ily to cyber technology as to any other type of attack or initiative in a conflict with 
another sovereign state. All that is required, Cook maintains, is the ability to identify 
the agents involved, the intentions with which they act, and the effects of their actions. 
Hence no revision or updating of Just War Theory is necessary in order to accom­
modate the central dilemmas of the cyber realm. Rather than argue for this thesis on 
the grounds that Just War Theory is capacious enough to accommodate the evolving 
nature of warfare, with cyberwar taking its place at the outer limits of those items to 
which Just War Theory can rightly apply, Cook reaches his conclusion by asserting 
the more ordinary nature of cyber attacks and cyberwar activities. Just War Theory 
applies to cyberwar, then, because there is nothing particularly special to accommo­
date that conventional war did not already require. 
Cook's thesis makes for an interesting contrast with May's, particularly in the 
characterization of cyberwar itself. While May says that cyberwar is a form of 
embargo or economic constraint, thus characterizing it as an ordinary form of eco­
nomic pressure, Cook takes precisely the opposite view. Not only do cyber attacks 
automatically count as acts of war, given their proximity to kinetic attacks in struc­
ture, they are more like war than the standard acts of war that form the para­
digm of our treatment of war. Cyber attacks are more potent than other attacks, 
primarily because once unleashed they require no human intervention to release 
their potential. Although Cook does not put it this way, a virus like S tuxnet can be 
fruitfully thought of as a kind of autonomous weapons system, since it functions 
according to its programming and effectively "takes the human out of the loop." 
Jens Ohlin's chapter examining the concept of causation as it applies to cyberwar 
identifies particular difficulties for the law of war in the context of cyberwar. Although 
causation is not in general an important concept for understanding the legal lim­
its imposed by IHL, it becomes essential to understand the role of causation where 
one attempts to understand the limits IHL imposes in the cyber arena. Because cyber 
attacks are particularly causally complex, it is essential for identifying what Ohlin, fol­
lowing George Fletcher, calls a "pattern of manifest criminality," namely that the rules 
governing attribution are clear and are able to trace judgments of.responsibility along 
causal lines. The greatest source of complexity lies in the causal role played by third 
parties, whose involvement may help produce acts and effects that violate the law of 
war. Until IHL has a more adequate account of causation, particularly as applied to 
intervening voluntary acts of other agents, it will not be able to clarify the permissibil­
ity of cyber interventions under the law of war. 
The chapters in the second part of this volume focus on the civil-military divide 
and the difficulty disentangling these frameworks in the context of cyber security and 
cyberwar. Stuart Macdonald's paper, which deals with cyberwar and the criminal law, 
addresses a fundamental aspect of the concept of responsibility as it relates to cyber 
terrorism. Macdonald's distinction between domestic and enemy criminal law reca­
pitulates the dual framework theories of earlier chapters in its distinction between 
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ordinary rules of criminal prosecution and rules governing the treatment of suspected 
terrorists. Macdonald points out that by treating cyber attacks under the heading of 
"enemy criminal law," the British have enabled intervention earlier to prevent, rather 
than merely punish, dangerous acts of cyber terrorism. 
Laurie Blank's chapter addresses the split between law-enforcement principles and 
the theory of war. Blank identifies the position of the notion of cyberwar relative to 
these two different jurisdictions as hovering in the middle. She allows that cyber­
war could constitute an "armed conflict" within the prevailing use of the term and 
against the background of the LOAC. However, such instances are unlikely, as under 
the principles and authority of international law, the relevant conflict must be fairly 
intense before cyber conflict would be rightly seen as part of an armed conflict. As 
Blank implicitly recognizes, cyberwar is an in-between concept that hovers between 
law-enforcement and military paradigms. As such it provides a theoretically useful 
way to test out the boundaries of our conception of war. 
Nicolo Bussolati's chapter echoes the thought that the possibility of significant 
destruction of infrastructure through cyberwar is particularly relevant given the 
increased role of non-state actors in current armed conflict. He goes yet further, how­
ever, and argues that the availability of cyber techniques in war has actually helped 
establish a place for non-state actors in international relations and, which in turn cre­
ates a challenge for how we think of cyberwar in relation to the traditional paradigm 
of war. Bussolati sees cyber attacks as constituting a use of force, and as posing a dan­
ger of the first order. Rather than view hacking as involving a lower risk of force than 
kinetic attacks, he might see such attacks as having comparably graver dangers and 
constituting a more, rather than less, invasive means of accomplishing military ends. 
The third part of this volume deals with a somewhat more applied topic, namely 
the ethics of hacking and spying. Duncan Hollis begins by weighing in strongly on 
James Cook's side of the debate about the nature of cyberwar, and whether it is part 
of the LOAC. The concepts of the jus ad bellum-the principles of justice accounting 
for when it is permissible to go to war-and the jus in bello-the principles that iden­
tify the manner of one's conducting war-apply by way of analogy with the non-cyber 
law of war and find an adequate foothold in the world of cyberwar to make it reason­
able to think of it as part of the law of armed conflict. International law does regu­
late cyberspace at the very least by analogy. However, Hollis laments the absence of a 
clear theory to explain why. The usual explanation-that IHL imposes boundaries on 
the permissibility of acts of war that should be thought of as extending to the cyber 
arena-strikes Hollis as a highly imperfect argument. A more flexible way of think­
ing of IHL, oriented towards principles rather than boundaries, might impose a duty 
to adopt the "least harmful means available" for achieving military objectives. And 
given that cyberwar can be less invasive and harmful than kinetic actions, IHL might 
impose an affirmative duty to attempt to achieve a military objective by hacking rather 
than kinetic action. 
Christopher Yoo weighs into the debate about the choice of frameworks for assess­
ing cyber activity in the context of war by discussing espionage. The argument falls on 
Larry May's side of the fence, in the debate between May and Cook. The chapter's claim 
is that cyber operations should mostly be thought more in the domain of espionage 
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and law enforcement than acts of war. Yoo's argument for this position-that cyber 
acts do not cause the same level of damage as kinetic attacks-might send us debat­
ing again how we characterize the damage caused by the S tuxnet virus. However, the 
point can be reasserted in another guise: the essential role of personal, internet-based 
information in the fight against terrorism cannot be over-estimated. As such, espio­
nage becomes a central tool in national security operations and many cyber opera­
tions are properly identified under this heading. 
The third chapter in this section, William Boothby's, treats cyberwar as a critically 
important domain for future warfare. He writes: 
The rifle, the bayonet, mortars, bombs, missiles, and mines will remain critically 
important tools in the conduct of hostilities in many future, conventional armed 
conflicts . . But cyberspace will . . .  become the environment in which adversaries 
employing some degree of operational sophistication will seek to gain and to main­
tain military advantage by leveraging their own hostile activities while impeding the 
enemy's capacity to organize and operate 
However, Boothby raises the concern that insofar as cyber operations typically involve 
the employment of deceptive tactics, they may be illegitimate and illegal under the 
laws of war. 
A fourth section deals with the crucial and difficult question of responsibility for 
cyber attacks. Marco Roscini identifies particular challenges to assessing responsibil­
ity for cyber attacks due to evidentiary hurdles. The problems he identifies stem on the 
one hand from the famously difficult problem of attribution in the domain of cyber 
attacks, combined with the evidentiary rules that govern international law, particu­
larly the rules on the use of force. 
S ean Watts's chapter represents something of a digression from our themes thus far, 
though an interesting and relevant one. It addresses the conflict between the principle 
of non-intervention in international law and the existence of low-level cyber signals 
among states. The question he poses is whether the existence of these cyber connec­
tions violates the principle of non-intervention. He offers interpretations of the latter 
principle that would allow low-level cyber connections to persist. 
Taken together, the chapters in this volume constitute a comprehensive examination of 
the challenges that have arisen in the law of armed conflict since the advent of cyber inter­
vention as a means for achieving military objectives. While authors are not in perfect 
agreement with one another, they have broad consensus on the identity of the challenges 
the world faces as a result of the advent of cyber technology as a means of war. The major 
problems addressed in the chapters in this volume-whether cyber operations constitute 
acts of war, the civil-military divide and the choice between law enforcement and mili­
tary frameworks, the ethics of hacking and espionage, and finally the attribution of legal 
and moral responsibility for cyber activities-cover the essential challenges in under­
standing the fifth dimension battlefield and in identifying the nascent legal and ethical 
boundaries within which national defense in cyber must operate. With cyber becoming 
an increasingly important technique for national self defense, clarity around the bound­
aries of war in the Fifth Dimension seems essential. We hope this volume contributes 
towards this end. 
